Browsing by Author "Newman, Patrick"

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5

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Modern Monetary Theory: An Austrian Interpretation of Recrudescent Keynesianism
(Springer, 2020) Newman, Patrick
Modern monetary theory (MMT) argues that governments can never go bankrupt because they have the power to print money to finance budget deficits. Consequently, debt monetization can achieve virtually any government objective desired. This paper uses Austrian economics to argue that MMT suffers from the flaws of all forms of Keynesian economics, particularly the original version of the 1930s and 1940s. MMT fails to understand capital-based macroeconomics and how government policy affects the temporal structure of production. MMT also neglects the importance of profit and loss accounting compared to government allocation of resources. The Austrian school argues that traditional New Keynesian countercyclical monetary policy results in a credit-induced boom and bust (Austrian business cycle theory) by injecting new money into private sector loans through the banking sector. However, Austrian analysis demonstrates that MMT’s monetary policy to monetize government deficits and increase the money supply through government spending will instead lead to secular economic stagnation and a stunted capital structure. Overall, the policy prescriptions of MMT are far more dangerous than traditional New Keynesian policies.
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The origins of the national banking system: The chase-cooke connection and the New Tork City banks
(Independent Institute, 2018) Newman, Patrick
The article offers information on the origins of the national banking system. Topics discussed include survival of the system during the Civil War; connection and motivation behind promoting 1863 act described by economic historians; and burden of trying to finance the conflict of American Civil War fall on the U.S. secretary of the treasury Salmon P. Chase. It also mention about the contribution of financial Jay Cooke in opening banking house in Washington to help treasury finance the war.
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Personnel is Policy: Regulatory Capture at the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929
(Cambridge University Press, 2019) Newman, Patrick
This paper uses the concept of "Personnel is Policy" to extend the theory of regulatory capture to the political appointment of agency commissioners. The "Personnel is Policy" theory provides three important insights. First, it shows that whether or not an interest group benefits from a regulatory agency depends on the particular individuals appointed to run it. Second, the president plays an important role in regulatory capture by nominating individuals to be appointed to the commission. Third, regulatory capture does not follow a pre-determined path because the commissioners continually change. The theory is then used to explain the early years of a prominent regulatory agency created during the Progressive Era: the Federal Trade Commission. From the perspective of the big business "trust" interest group, their success at capturing the FTC to achieve their goals of controlling competition and blocking hostile antitrust actions was largely a result of who was appointed to the commission. The trusts were the most successful during the years of 1915–1916 and 1925–1929. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of Institutional Economics is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act
(Springer Nature, 2018) Newman, Patrick
This paper argues that Senator John Sherman of Ohio was motivated to introduce an antitrust bill in late 1889 partly as a way of enacting revenge on his political rival, General and former Governor Russell Alger of Michigan, because Sherman believed that Alger personally had cost him the presidential nomination at the 1888 Republican national convention. When discussing his bill on the Senate floor and elsewhere, Sherman repeatedly brought up Alger’s relationship, which in reality was rather tenuous, with the well-known Diamond Match Company. The point of mentioning Alger was to hurt Alger’s future political career and his presidential aspirations in 1892. Sherman was able to pursue his revenge motive by combining it with the broader Republican goals of preserving high tariffs and attacking the trusts. As a result, this paper reinforces previous public choice literature arguing that the 1890 Sherman Act was not passed in the public interest, but instead advanced private interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Public Choice is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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Taking government out of politics: Murray rothbard on political and local reform during the progressive era
(Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2019) Newman, Patrick
This paper analyzes and elaborates on what Murray Rothbard would have included in Chapter 10 of his nine-chapter manuscript on the Progressive Era (Rothbard 2017). In Chapter 10, Rothbard planned to describe the political and local reforms of the fourth party system (1896-1932). The reforms included voter registration, ballot changes, direct election of senators, the primary system, attacks on machine politics, the institutionalization of civil service, and the expansion of city governments. While many historians have argued that these changes were designed to expand democracy and reduce corruption, Rothbard would have shown how they were intended to restrict democracy and centralize power in the hands of established elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics is the property of Ludwig von Mises Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)