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ItemAn Economic Analysis of Contractual Relationships in Franchising Systems with Case Studies(University of Edinburgh, 1988) Dnes, Antony WilliamFieldwork methods are used to analyse the nature of franchise systems in the UK. These systems are viewed in terms of their contractual relationships following theoretical approaches suggested by the economics of organisation, including agency analysis. In particular, product, brand and specialised-input franchises are identified and fee schedules are placed in the context of the wider franchise contract. The fieldwork covers 19 case studies of UK franchising systems. The thesis contains a predictive theory of franchising. This identifies initial investments which franchisees undertake as hostages with screening and bonding properties for the franchisor. These hostages influence monitoring costs. The thesis makes an operational, use of modern transaction-cost ideas. ItemAsymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land(The University of Chicago Press, 2009-01) Dnes, Antony WilliamThe legal doctrine on servitudes has long been viewed as a Byzantine tangle of doctrine emanating from property law, contract law, and courts of equity. This paper explains the structure of the law governing servitudes on land using key ideas from the economics of information, focusing on easements and covenants and the rules governing their formation and application. We develop a model of land markets that incorporates asymmetric information (adverse selection) and specialization in ownership and use this to offer a rationale for the seemingly ad hoc limits on the use of servitudes. We stress the inability of sellers of land credibly to assure buyers that land is not encumbered by servitudes. Our model explains variations in legal doctrine over time and across jurisdictions, particularly comparing servitudes in the United States and in England. ItemBehavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs(KYKLOS, 2010-11) Dnes, Antony William; Garoupa, NunoIn this paper, we examine the street gang as a special case of the dysfunctional social group, the members of which are often regarded as exhibiting apparently irrational behavior. Individuals in this setting have nuisance value for the rest of society and engage in considerable risk taking for the benefit of the group. We focus on the formation of street gangs but do indicate possible extensions of our analysis to other gang-like groups, which could include collusive business interests, terrorist cells, and even sports hooligans. ItemCommitment in Licensing Contracts: an Application of Hostage Analysis(Applied Economics Letters, 2001-05) Dnes, Antony WilliamExamines the applications of the economic theory of hostages on license agreements. Applicability of lump-sum payment limits to problems involving the licensing of intellectual capital; Demand and cost conditions in license agreements; Schedules for licensing fees. ItemCorporate Governance: an International Perspective(Managerial & Decision Economics, 2005-10) Dnes, Antony WilliamIn this special edition of Managerial and Decision Economics, I have gathered together papers from a number of international experts in corporate governance. The intention is to look at aspects of corporate governance from several vantage points outside of America, following the Enron and similar debacles. ItemEnron, Corporate Governance and Deterrence(Managerial & Decision Economics, 2005-10) Dnes, Antony WilliamThe lessons taught by the fiscal scandals involving firms like Enron and WorldCom are examined. These scandals have resulted in the reform of corporate governance in America. ItemExternality and Organizational Choice in Franchising(Journal of Economics and Business, 2005-01) Dnes, Antony William; Garoupa, NunoIn this paper, we examine some implications of externality for the organization of firms. The need to control externality explains the selection, at the level of the chain, of full integration, dealerships or franchising systems, or systems of dual distribution where company and franchised outlets operate simultaneously, in preference to unrestricted retailing. We show that there could be a trade-off between managerial motivation and effective controlling of externality. This trade-off can explain the selection of particular organizational structures within franchising. In particular, non-separable externality, where the value of the externality depends upon characteristics of both the generating and affected unit, is costly to control contractually and could encourage integration.