Understanding Congress's Role in Terminating Unpopular Wars: A Comparison of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars

dc.contributor.authorMcHugh, Kelly A.
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-20T01:03:18Z
dc.date.available2022-10-20T01:03:18Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractI examine how Congress reacts when the president refuses to terminate involvement in an unpopular war. To address this, I devise a set of hypotheses based on David Mayhew’s work Congress and the Electoral Connection and seek to predict the conditions under which Congress will employ three strategies to end a war: enacting legislation, framing exit strategies, and privately lobbying the president. I test these hypotheses in two cases, the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and conclude that the hypotheses provide a compelling explanation for Congressional behavior during the two wars.en_US
dc.identifier.citationMcHugh, K. (2014). Understanding Congress’s Role in Terminating Unpopular Wars : A Comparison of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. Democracy and Security, 10(3), 191–224.en_US
dc.identifier.issn17419166
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.48602341&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s5615486
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11416/868
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherRoutledgeen_US
dc.subjectVietnam War, 1961-1975en_US
dc.subjectIraq War, 2003-2011en_US
dc.subjectInternational relationsen_US
dc.subjectcen_US
dc.titleUnderstanding Congress's Role in Terminating Unpopular Wars: A Comparison of the Vietnam and Iraq Warsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Files