Commitment in Licensing Contracts: an Application of Hostage Analysis

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dc.contributor.authorDnes, Antony William
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-13T20:47:55Z
dc.date.available2017-04-13T20:47:55Z
dc.date.issued2001-05
dc.description.abstractExamines the applications of the economic theory of hostages on license agreements. Applicability of lump-sum payment limits to problems involving the licensing of intellectual capital; Demand and cost conditions in license agreements; Schedules for licensing fees.
dc.identifier.citationDnes, Antony W. "Commitment in Licensing Contracts: An Application of Hostage Analysis." Applied Economics Letters, vol. 8, no. 5, May 2001, pp. 289-290. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/135048501750157387.
dc.identifier.issn1350-4851
dc.identifier.otherdoi:10.1080/135048501750157387
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11416/305
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=4422944&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s5615486
dc.publisherApplied Economics Letters
dc.subjectLicense agreements
dc.subjectIntellectual capital
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleCommitment in Licensing Contracts: an Application of Hostage Analysis
dc.typeArticle

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